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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACQUELINE RICCIUTI, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JACK C. ROBINSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8070 
Appellant's statement of facts is incomplete. The 
jury could have believed that the following was the 
factual situation under which the accident occurred: 
1. A girl's head in the driver's lap (R. 8, 41, 51, 67). 
2. Speed in excess of 60 miles per hour (see below 
and argument under Point II) . 
. 3. Darkness (R. 7). 
4. Light snow falling ( R. 7, 38, 80). 
5. Wet road (R. 20 and appellant's brief p. 3). 
6. Residential area (appellant's brief p. 5). 
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7. Four A. M. ( R. 8, 33) after having been up all 
night (R. 76 to 80). 
8. Driver smoking a cigarette while driving under 
above circumstances (R. 8, 41, 67, 83 and appel-
lant's brief p. 3, 8, 9, 24). 
Appellant's attorn1ey may choose to believe the de-
fendant when he said the girl's head was not in his lap. 
But the jury could have believed not only the plaintiff, 
but also the t\vo disinterested police officers who all 
agreed that at the ti1ne of the accident and thereafter 
the defendant unequivocally repeated that the girl's 
head \Yas in his lap, and the accident occurred ·when he 
dropped the cigarette in his lap or on her hair and was 
afraid it would ignite the girl's hair (R. 8, 41, 51, 76). 
Testimony by Sergeant Bennett that the car was 
traveling n1ore than 60 miles per hour was properly 
before the jury. This is discussed in connection with 
the argu1nent under Point II. 
As further evidence fro1n which the jury was justi-
fied in believing that defendant's speed was much greater 
than the 35 to 40 1niles per hour he claimed to be travel-
ing (R. 83) in the 30 1nile per hour speed zone (R. 74) 
the record contains the follo\ving: 
After the rar left the road the right rear fender 
\vas crushed on a tree and the rear bumper was hooked 
on the tree and t\visted backward and torn off its 
fastenings 011 thP right side (R. 35, 48, 66). Then the 
car \Vent -over a five inch high curb with such momentum 
that the underside of the rar gouged out a large piece 
of turf before thP ~prings could raise the car up to 
thP UP\\' level (R. 35, 36, 47, 71). In going over the 
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san1e five inch curb, the rear wheels left the ground and 
did not come do,vn for a distance of 20 feet forward 
(R. 36, 48, 49, 72, 73, 74). While the rear end of the car 
was in the air the right rear door and hinge pillar post 
,vere torn off the car by hitting another tree (R. 36, 48, 
G6). 
Furthermore the car traveled approximately 192 
feet on the parking and an additional 183 feet after it 
returned to the road (R. 37, 38) before it could be 
brought to a stop (R. 85, 86). 
ARG Uj\IIENT 
POINT I. rrHE QUESTION OF WILFUL MIS-
CONDUCT WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE JURY. 
THE IjA W OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT 
The abstract definition of wilful misconduct quoted 
from Stack v. Kearns, 221 P. 2d 594 (Utah, 1950) at the 
upper part of page 10 of appellant's brief is certainly 
correct. Ho,vever, appellant's attempted application 
thereof is not in accordance with the decisions. 
The precise question before this court is not simply 
"\vhether defendant was guilty of wilful misconduct. It is 
rather: 
Do the facts so clearly show the absence of wilful 
1nisconduct that reasonable 1ninds cannot differ 
in so concluding. 
Exa1nination of a large number of wilful misconduct 
cases will show that where the surrounding facts indicate 
a culpable disregard of circumstances which should have 
made defendant apprehensive of danger previous to the 
emergency which culminated in the accident, the courts 
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hold that reasonable n1inds can differ as to whether such 
disregard amounted to wilful misconduct and the rnRP 
should go to the jury. 
On the other hand where the facts show only lTIOlnen-
tary inattention or an act of mere carel'essness or poor 
judgment, then the courts hold that there could not be 
w·ilful Inisconduct as a n1atter of law. 
The following cases 'vill illustrate the above state-
ment of the la,v. They are not intended to be exhaustive, 
but they are representative. 
ILLUSTRATIVE~ CASES HOLDING WILFUL 
11ISCONDUCT FOR .JUR.Y 
Continued excessive speed on na1To'v road 'vith 
da1np shoulders around curve after previous near 
n1ishap and requ'ests to slo'v do,vn. Also jury could 
have believed that 'vas 1naking trick high speed 
turns. Stack v. Kearns, 221 ]>. 2d 594 (Utah, 
1950). 
Driver fell asleep at wheel before accident and 
then fell asleep hours later at time of accident. 
Esernia 'L'. Overland Moving Co., 206 P. 2d 621 
(Utah, 1949). Fron1 dissenting opinion by Judge 
Wad e. Case decided on other grounds. 
Atte1npting to drive around kno'vn dangerous 
curve at 55 1niles per hour in rain with windshield 
wiper not 'vorking, 'vithout di1ninishing speed. 
Car swa vin {)' fron1 side to side. Previous skidding 
and req~ests to slo"r do,vn. Norton r. Puter, 32 
I>. 2d 172 ( Oal., 193+). 
Driving 40 to 50 1niles per hour at night on one of 
principal streets of Denver with one hand, and 
with right ar1n around girl co1npanion, gre'eting 
rf\p0nted warnings 'vith indifference and laughter, 
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and kissing girl just before collision. Schlesing~r 
v. Miller, 52 P. 2d 402 (Colo., 1935). Statute IS 
worded "wilful and wanton disregard of rights 
of others." 
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES HOLDING NO WILFUL 
MISCONDUCT 
The cases cited by appellant are used for this section 
since they are presu1nably the Inost favorable to him. 
Momentarily took eyes off road to pick up drop-
p'ed cigarette while driving 50 to 60 1niles per 
hour 100 feet fro1n bridge. No prior misconduct. 
Neyens v. Gehl, 15 N. W. 2d 888 (Iowa, 1944). 
Driving at high but not excessive speed. Accident 
occurred when attention momentarily distracted 
from driving by presence of b1ee in car and on 
wrist. Rindge v. Holbrook, 149 A. 231 (Conn., 
1930). 
Driving at 45 to 55 miles per hour at 2 A.M. and 
withdrawing attention from road while turning 
radio dial attached to steering post for period of 
time. Lost control of car trying to avoid slow 
moving car on road ahead. Did not notice car 
ahead until within 50 feet of it. Bashor v. Bashor, 
85 P. 2d 732 (Colo., 1938). (Strong dissenting 
opinion.) 
Attempting to defrost windshield on lighted high-
way at night by placing palm of hand on it while 
traveling about 40 miles per hour. Accident oc-
curred when did not see slow moving truck ahead 
until within 15 feet of it. Rowe v. Vander K olk, 
270 N. W. 788 (Mich., 1936). 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF WILFUL MIS-
CONDUCT TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
As pointed out in respondent's statement of facts 
above, there was tes~imony prop·erly before the jury 
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from which it could have believed the following to he the 
factual situation in this case: 
In spite of having been up all night, with visibility 
limited by snow and darkness, and on a wet residential 
street, defendant drove at more than 60 1n.p.h. while he 
smoked a cigarette and rested a girls' head in his la )J. 
This certainly ainounts to a culpable disregard of 
circumstances which should have 1nade defendant appre-
hensive of danger previous to the e1nergency which cul-
minated in the accident, so that the question of wilful 
1nisconduct was properly for the jury. 
POINT II. SERGEANT BENNETT'S OPINION 
AS TO SPEED WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
This clailned error is summarized on page 18 of 
appellant's brief as follows: 
"In view of the fact that th~e officer did not 
possess the qualifications necessary to 1nake this 
opinion and the further fact that the circum-
stances under which this accident happened can 
i;n no way be related to any accepted study of 
speeds in relation to brake marks, road surfaces 
and reaction time, it must therefore be concluded 
that a proper foundation was not laid for the 
opinion and it was error to admit it." 
It is submitted that the. following adequately quali-
fies Sergeant Bennett: 
I-Ie had been 'vith the city trtlffic department for 
practically 12 years before he investigated this accident 
(R. 43), had investigated a great many accidents (R. 51}, 
and was thoroughly fan1iliar with the concepts of re-
action tilne, coefficients of friction for different types 
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of pave1nent and under different weather conditions, and 
the use of the approved chart to determine stopping 
distances at various sp'eeds and road conditions. See 
particularly pages 43 to 46 of the record where Mr. 
Hanson cross examined him on these matters. Also note 
1\t[r. Hanson's statement (R. 45) : 
"1-Iowever, you have had extensive experience 
in this sort of 'vork, and you 1nay be able to help 
us a little bit on that." 
On the question of whether the particular circum-
stance:-; of this case are such that the accept'ed study of 
the relationship between speed and stopping distances 
under various road conditions cannot be used, the record 
sho\\'H the following: 
The car traveled approximately 373 feet from the 
time it l~ft the highway to the ti1ne it stopped. Of this 
distance the first approximately 190 or 192 feet were on 
the parking, and the remaining approximately 183 feet 
(174 or 175 plus 9) were back on the highway (R. 37, 
38). 
Appellant's contention appears to be that the con-
ditions are not susceptible of an expert opinion as to 
speed because part of the distance traveled was on the 
'vet grass parking, hitting trees, and bouncing over 
driveways. However, this does not prevent ascertaining 
fro1n accepted speed and braking distance studies the 
speed of the car after it return'ed to the road. 
The following testimony (R. 52) refers only to the 
183 feet the car traveled after it left the parking and 
return1ed to the street. 
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"BY MR. HOROWITZ: 
Q. I would like to ask just one question. Re-
ferring to the chart that you have there, at 
what speed under those conditions would a 
car have to be traveling in to take 183 fe1et to 
stop1 
MR. HANSON: You 1nean the condition of 
the street. 
Q. The conditions of the street at the tiine. 
A. 183 feet. 
Q. 183 fe-et. 
A. The nearest I can get to that is 187. Wait a 
Ininute. 185, at 65 percent coeficient of fric-
tion is exactly 60 miles per hour. 
Q. 60 miles per hour. Thank you very much. 
A. rrha t is actual braking distance. 
Q. That is the figure I \vant." 
Th1e reason braking distance is the proper figure 
is because reaction time was taken up while the car was 
on the parking. 
As a proper foundation the following testimony is 
in the record: The car was in good mechanical condition 
(R. 84). The defendant applied the brakes as soon as 
he felt the car going onto the parking (R. 85 ). He 
wasn't sure his foot was on the brak'e all the while he 
was ·bouncing around on the parking, but the car stopped 
bouncing wh1en it got back on the road (R. 85, 86). This 
\Vas under a road condition of wet high-type asphalt 
which has a coefficient of friction of 65 per cent (R. 45, 
52). 
It is difficult to see how appellant can claim that one 
isolated part of Sergeant Bennett's testimony can be 
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prejudicial 'error when the record also contains this 
other testimony by Sergeant Bennett not objected to at 
the trial or claimed to be error on appeal, concluding 
fro1n the accepted chart that the vehicl1e was traveling 
approximately 60 miles per hour after it left the parking 
and returned to the road, so that the speed must have 
be·en in excess of 60 miles per hour when the car first 
left the road. 
POINT III. THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE 
CORRECT. 
In Instruction No. 5 the jury was instructed that a 
host is not obligated to his guest to exercise ordinary 
care, but his only obligation to such guest is to refrain 
fro1n 'vilful misconduct. 
In Instruction No. 6 the jury was plainly and cor-
rectly instructed as to the elem:ents of wilful misconduct. 
This instruction is based on the case of Stack v. Kearns, 
221 P. 2d 594 (Utah, 1950), which appellant quotes from 
at page 10 of his brief as containing a correct definition 
of 'vilful misconduct. 
The judge reiterat'ed in Instructions Nos. 7 and 8 
that if the jury found the defendant was negligent, or 
even if he intentionally did something that was wrong-
ful, still a case of wilful misconduct would not be estab-
lished unl1ess his conduct was characterized by the 
ele1nents of wilfulness previously mentioned (in Instruc-
tion No. 6). 
Appellant's argument that the instructions were 
erroneous does not take issue with any of the above 
instructions, but seems to be centered on Instruction No. 
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16 which contains definitions of negligence and ordinary 
care. With respect th'ereto he declares that: 
"By instructing the jury on the lPgal dPfini-
tion applicable to the negligent acts of one guilt~,. 
of a tort, the court entirely ignored the concept 
of \Vilful 1nisconduct, and ther'ehy delimited anrl 
foreclosed in the 1nindR of the jury th~ nece~sary 
legal ele1nents of the case." (p. 21, 22) 
This contention fron1 appellant's brief is not justified 
as is shown by the abov'e state1nents concerning Instruc-
tions Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
A.t page 22 of his brief, appellant quietly ad1nits 
that there 'vere other instructions that "alluded to'' the 
doctrine of \vilful 1nisconduct. But then he goes on to 
say that it isn't necessary to consider wlrether those other 
instructions \Vere correct because "this court has long 
held the vie"r that instructions which are contradictory 
or conflicting are prejudicially erroneous if they effect 
t' . 1 . . " a rna ,er1a Issue. 
1\..n exan1ination of Instruction No. 16 will show 
whether or not it contradicts the other instructions and 
makes negligence rather than .wilful misconduct the test 
of liability. Instruction No. 16 begins \vith the following 
state1nent: 
"In order to assist you in determining this casre, 
the follo\ving definitions and explanations are 
given:" 
The rest of Instruction No. 16 contains definitions and 
explanations of burden of proof, preponderance of evi-
dence, proxilnat'e cause, negligence and ordinary care. 
The 'vords "wilful 1nisconduct" \vere inserted to indicate 
10 
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that it as well as negligence is not an absolute term, 
but depends upon the surrounding circurnstances. No-
·where does this instruction state any test of liability. 
It ~iinply contains definitions and explanations of vari-
ous legal terrns and concepts used in other parts of the 
instructions. 
Appellant S1eems to assume that because this is a 
\vilful 1nisconduct case the mere presence of the neg-
ligence and ordinary care definitions and explanations 
1nake~ the instructions contradictory. However, the 
fallacy of this assumption is readily shown by a con-
sideration of Instructions Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 referred to 
above. In those instructions the jury is plainly informed 
that negligence and lack of ordinary care cannot con-
stitute -vvilful misconduct. The words "negligence" and 
''ordinary care" are legal terms with a particular mean-
ing in the la-vv. Since the jury had been instructed that 
neither negligence nor lack of ordinary care would be 
sufficient to find for the plaintiff, it was only proper 
that they b1e instructed as to the legal meaning of those 
terrns. And of course the appropriate place for this is 
in an instruction such as No. 16 which is an omnibus 
instruction defining various legal terms. 
Since the instructions are not contradictory, the 
cases cited by appellant are not in point and need no 
refutation. 
The instructions to the jury contained a correct 
definition of wilful misconduct and application thereof 
to the facts of this case, and were clear and not 
contradictory. 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
In the present case the judgment should be affirmed. 
The question of wilful misconduct was rightly before 
tlre jury and was duly determined by it. There was no 
prejudicial error to overcome the presumption of cor-
rectness of the lower court's judgment, or require the 
plaintiff to undergo the expense and ordeal of a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jerome Horowitz, 
Attorney for Respondent 
12 
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